Evaluation of a Two-way Datalink for Airborne Surveillance of and Communication with a Remotely Operated Aircraft Operating in the National Airspace System by Clark, Timothy R.
University of Tennessee, Knoxville
Trace: Tennessee Research and Creative
Exchange
Masters Theses Graduate School
8-2002
Evaluation of a Two-way Datalink for Airborne
Surveillance of and Communication with a
Remotely Operated Aircraft Operating in the
National Airspace System
Timothy R. Clark
University of Tennessee - Knoxville
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at Trace: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Masters Theses by an authorized administrator of Trace: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. For more information,
please contact trace@utk.edu.
Recommended Citation
Clark, Timothy R., "Evaluation of a Two-way Datalink for Airborne Surveillance of and Communication with a Remotely Operated
Aircraft Operating in the National Airspace System. " Master's Thesis, University of Tennessee, 2002.
https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_gradthes/2044
To the Graduate Council:
I am submitting herewith a thesis written by Timothy R. Clark entitled "Evaluation of a Two-way
Datalink for Airborne Surveillance of and Communication with a Remotely Operated Aircraft Operating
in the National Airspace System." I have examined the final electronic copy of this thesis for form and
content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Science, with a major in Aviation Systems.
Dr. Frederick W. Stellar, Major Professor
We have read this thesis and recommend its acceptance:
Dr. Ralph D. Kimberlin, Dr. George W. Garrison
Accepted for the Council:
Dixie L. Thompson
Vice Provost and Dean of the Graduate School
(Original signatures are on file with official student records.)
To the Graduate Council:
I am submitting herewith a thesis written by Timothy R. Clark entitled “Evaluation of a Two-way
Datalink for Airborne Surveillance of and Communication with a Remotely Operated Aircraft
Operating in the National Airspace System.”  I have examined the final electronic copy of this
thesis for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Master of Science, with a major in Aviation Systems.
 Dr. Frederick W. Stellar                              
Major Professor
We have read this thesis and
recommend its acceptance:
 Dr. Ralph D. Kimberlin                         
 Dr. George W. Garrison                       
Accepted for the Council:
 Dr. Anne Mayhew                                 
Vice Provost and
Dean of Graduate Studies
(Original signatures are on file with official student records.)
EVALUATION OF A TWO-WAY DATALINK FOR
AIRBORNE SURVEILLANCE OF AND COMMUNICATION
WITH A REMOTELY OPERATED AIRCRAFT OPERATING
IN THE NATIONAL AIRSPACE SYSTEM
A Thesis
Presented for the
Master of Science
Degree
The University of Tennessee, Knoxville
Timothy Robert Clark
August 2002
ii
Acknowledgements
I wish to thank all those who sustained and encouraged me in completing the Master of
Science in Aviation Systems program.
I thank the United States Naval Test Pilot School for initiating my post-graduate
education opportunity, and Professor Stellar at the University of Tennessee Space Institute for his
informative discussion of the air traffic control system.  I also thank Mr. Mayer at the FAA’s Los
Angeles Air Route Traffic Control Center, for his willingness to share his experience with the
Nation’s air traffic control system and the operation of remotely operated vehicles within it.
Most importantly, I thank my family whose endless encouragement enabled me to
continue the program and complete this work.
.
iii
Abstract
The purpose of this study is to examine the use of a two-way digital datalink to implement
the airborne surveillance and communication functions with a Remotely Operated Aircraft in the
National Airspace System.  These Air Traffic Control functions are currently implemented using
primary and secondary radar systems for airborne surveillance, and radio transmissions for voice
communications.
The present Air Traffic Control system was examined, as well as existing datalink
technologies and surveillance and communication equipment.  Remotely Operated Aircraft are
currently employed almost exclusively by the military, and operational experience in the National
Airspace System is very limited.  Several key military Remotely Operated Aircraft systems were
evaluated, including their operations in the National Airspace System.  There are numerous
potential uses for commercial Remotely Operated Aircraft operations in the National Airspace
System to satisfy varied missions and roles, and the issues associated with large numbers of
unmanned aircraft operating in the National Airspace System was investigated.  The information
used in this study was collected from various published sources, as well as from a number of
interviews with knowledgeable persons in the Remotely Operated Aircraft industry and the
Federal Aviation Administration.
Remotely Operated Aircraft have been established as viable military platforms, and a
variety of civilian missions are under consideration to extend their demonstrated usefulness.  As
civilian Remotely Operated Aircraft system designs and concepts of operation are refined, many
cost-effective applications have been identified for using Remotely Operated Aircraft in new roles
or in roles currently being performed by manned aircraft.  Large numbers of Remotely Operated
Aircraft are expected to be operated in the National Airspace System in the future, and the Air
Traffic Control system must be able to accommodate their unique needs and facilitate the safe
and efficient operation of Remotely Operated Aircraft in the National Airspace System.
iv
Two-way digital datalink technology has significant potential for use in implementing the
airborne surveillance and communication functions with Remotely Operated Aircraft in the
National Airspace System.  A datalink-based Air Traffic Control system provides more accurate
and comprehensive time-critical surveillance information to the air traffic controller, and facilitates
more efficient communications of large amounts of useful information between the air traffic
controller and Remotely Operated Aircraft remote operator.  It is recommended that two-way
digital datalink technology should be pursued for implementing the airborne surveillance and
communication functions with a Remotely Operated Aircraft in the National Airspace System.
Although this technology has many key benefits, there are several important operational, safety
and security issues that must be addressed before the system can be fully implemented in the
National Airspace System.
vTable of Contents
Section               Title                                                                                                                  Page No.
1.0 NATIONAL AIRSPACE SYSTEM..........................................................................................1
1.1 Airborne Surveillance Functional Requirement .................................................................1
1.2 Airborne Communication Functional Requirement ............................................................1
1.3 Current NAS Airborne Surveillance System ......................................................................1
1.4 Current NAS Airborne Communication System.................................................................3
1.4.1 Voice Radio Communications.....................................................................................3
1.4.2 Digital Datalink Communications ................................................................................4
1.5 Current Airspace Classifications and Requirements .........................................................4
1.5.1 Class A Airspace.........................................................................................................4
1.5.2 Class B Airspace.........................................................................................................5
1.5.3 Class C Airspace ........................................................................................................6
1.5.4 Class D Airspace ........................................................................................................6
1.5.5 Class E Airspace.........................................................................................................6
1.5.6 Class G Airspace ........................................................................................................6
1.5.7 Special Use Airspace..................................................................................................7
2.0 REMOTELY OPERATED AIRCRAFT ...................................................................................8
2.1 Remotely Operated Aircraft Missions and Roles ...............................................................8
2.1.1 Military ROA Operations .............................................................................................8
2.1.2 Civilian ROA Operations.............................................................................................9
2.2 ROA Operational Elements................................................................................................9
2.2.1 See And Avoid ............................................................................................................9
2.2.2 Mission Profiles.........................................................................................................11
2.2.3 Remote Operator ......................................................................................................11
2.2.3.1 Vehicle Command and Control................................................................................12
2.2.3.2 Vehicle Communications.......................................................................................13
vi
2.2.3.3 Operator Qualification and Training ......................................................................13
2.2.4 System Design and Installed Equipment..................................................................13
2.2.4.1 ROA Design Requirements...................................................................................14
2.2.4.2 ROA Equipment Requirements.............................................................................14
2.3 Remotely Operated Aircraft Systems...............................................................................14
2.3.1 RQ-1 Predator ROA..................................................................................................15
2.3.1.1 Predator Command and Control System ..............................................................15
2.3.2 RQ-4A Global Hawk ROA.........................................................................................17
2.3.2.1 Global Hawk Launch Recovery Element ..............................................................18
2.3.2.2 Global Hawk Mission Control Element..................................................................19
2.4 ROA Ground Station Systems .........................................................................................19
2.4.1 Tactical Ground Control Stations..............................................................................19
2.4.2 Strategic Ground Control Stations ............................................................................20
2.4.3 Tactical Control System............................................................................................20
3.0 CURRENT ROA-NAS INTEGRATION ................................................................................23
3.1 Current ROA Airborne Surveillance Implementations .....................................................23
3.1.1 Restricted Airspace...................................................................................................23
3.1.2 Class E Airspace / Visual Flight Rules......................................................................23
3.1.3 Positive Controlled Airspace / Instrument Flight Rules ............................................24
3.2 Current ROA Airborne Communication Implementations................................................24
4.0 AIRBORNE DATALINK SYSTEMS .....................................................................................26
4.1 Airborne Datalink Systems Operation..............................................................................26
4.1.1 Terrestrial-Based Datalink Systems .........................................................................26
4.1.2 Satellite-Based Datalink Systems.............................................................................26
4.2 Automatic dependent surveillance - broadcast................................................................27
5.0 ROA DATALINK SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION IN THE NAS............................................29
5.1 Airborne Surveillance Functional Implementation ...........................................................29
vii
5.1.1 System Operation .....................................................................................................29
5.1.2 System Feasibility .....................................................................................................30
5.1.3 Human Factors Considerations ................................................................................30
5.2 Airborne Communication Functional Implementation ......................................................31
5.2.1 System Operation .....................................................................................................32
5.2.2 System Feasibility .....................................................................................................32
5.2.3 Human Factors Considerations ................................................................................32
5.3 Datalink / ROA System Integration ..................................................................................33
5.3.1 Datalink Technology and Equipment ........................................................................33
5.3.2 System Implementation ............................................................................................34
5.4 NAS Integration of Datalink-Based Surveillance/Communication System......................35
5.4.1 Transition From Current System...............................................................................35
5.4.2 System Selection, Regulation and Certification........................................................36
5.5 Safety Considerations ......................................................................................................37
5.5.1 Datalink Safety Advantages......................................................................................37
5.5.2 Datalink Safety Issues ..............................................................................................38
5.6 Efficiency Considerations.................................................................................................40
5.6.1 Airborne Surveillance................................................................................................40
5.6.2 Airborne Communication ..........................................................................................41
5.7 Security Considerations ...................................................................................................41
7.0 RECOMMENDATIONS .......................................................................................................46
WORKS CONSULTED........................................................................................................48
Bibligraphy .......................................................................................................................49
References.......................................................................................................................50
VITA.....................................................................................................................................51
viii
List of Figures
Figure No.          Title                                                                                                        Page No.
1-1 NAS Airspace Classifications .......................................................................5
2-1 RQ-1A Predator Aircraft..............................................................................16
2-2 RQ-1B Predator-B Aircraft ..........................................................................16
2-3 Predator Ground Control Station ................................................................17
2-4 RQ-4A Global Hawk Aircraft .......................................................................18
2-5 Tactical Control Station Operators Station .................................................22
ix
List of Acronyms and Abbreviations
ADS-B Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast
AGL Above Ground Level
ARSA Airport Radar Service Area
ATA Airport Traffic Area
ATC Air Traffic Control
BLOS Beyond Line of Sight
CNS Communication, Navigation and Surveillance
COA Certificate of Authorization
FAR Federal Aviation Regulation
FL Flight Level
FLIR Forward-Looking Infrared
ft Feet
GPS Global Positioning System
HAE High Altitude-Endurance
IFR Instrument Flight Rules
ISR Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
lbs Pounds
LOS Line of Sight
LRE Launch and Recovery Element
MAE Medium Altitude-Endurance
MCE Mission Control Element
MSL Mean Sea Level
NAS National Airspace System
NM Nautical Mile
PCA Positive Control Area
RF Radio Frequency
ROA Remotely Operated Aircraft
SAR Synthetic Aperture Radar
SATCOM Satellite Communications
TCA Terminal Control Area
TCAS Traffic-alert and Collision Avoidance System
TCS Tactical Control Station
UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UHF Ultra High Frequency
VDL VHF Datalink
VFR Visual Flight Rules
VHF Very High Frequency
11.0 NATIONAL AIRSPACE SYSTEM
1.1        AIRBORNE SURVEILLANCE FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENT
The Air Traffic Control (ATC) system performs a number of different functions to ensure
the safe and efficient operation of aircraft in the National Airspace System (NAS).  One of these
critical functions is the airborne surveillance of manned and unmanned aircraft operating within
the NAS.  Airborne surveillance involves initially acquiring an aircraft, positively identifying it, and
establishing a position track on it.  The positive identification and tracking of each aircraft must be
maintained continuously from takeoff until landing in controlled airspace.  This information is used
to ensure all aircraft are safely separated from one another and from airborne hazards such as
weather, and to allow each aircraft access to desired routes or airspace to complete their
missions as efficiently as possible.
1.2        AIRBORNE COMMUNICATION FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENT
A second critical function performed by the ATC system to ensure safe and efficient
operations in the NAS is maintaining communication with airborne manned and unmanned
aircraft.  Airborne communication involves establishing an informational link with the aircraft prior
to takeoff, and continuously maintaining that link while operating in the NAS until the aircraft
lands.  The purpose of maintaining communications with aircraft operating in the NAS is to enable
two-way exchanges of information between the pilot (or remote operator) and ground-based
controller.  The information communicated to and from the airborne aircraft may include inquiries,
statuses, data or requests and directives.  Acceptable forms of communication with the aircraft
include verbal and non-verbal exchanges of information with the pilot or remote operator in
control of the aircraft.
1.3        CURRENT NAS AIRBORNE SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM
The airborne surveillance function is currently implemented in the ATC system using
three methods.1  The first and most basic method relies on the pilot to report when the aircraft is
over a specified ground location when not in radar contact.  This allows the air traffic controller to
2establish the aircraft’s position when not in radar contact.  The other two methods involve the use
of ground-based radar equipment to acquire and continuously track an aircraft.  In the first radar-
based method, the radar return from the airborne aircraft is used to establish its position and flight
parameters.  This method is referred to as primary radar.  The effectiveness of primary radar is
dependant upon a number of parameters such as the performance characteristics of the radar
equipment, transmitted energy levels, distance from ground radar system to the aircraft,
proportion of radar energy reflected by the aircraft, and environmental considerations.  In general,
the accuracy and effectiveness of primary radar in determining the position of an aircraft and
maintaining a continuous track diminishes as the distance to the aircraft increases.
The second radar-based method of implementing the airborne surveillance function
involves the use of a transponder system installed in the aircraft.  This is referred to as secondary
radar.  In this method, a signal transmitted from the aircraft is received on the ground.  This signal
may include a variety of aircraft information including the aircraft’s identification, position, altitude,
airspeed, and flight route information.  The secondary radar system that is currently in
widespread use is the “Mode-C” transponder.  The Mode-C transponder signal includes aircraft
identification and altitude information.  The transponder normally transmits its signal only when it
is interrogated by the ground surveillance radar system.  This Mode-C signal is used in
conjunction with the primary radar information to implement the airborne surveillance function.
A third method for implementing the airborne surveillance function under development is
use of a digital datalink to transmit aircraft information to a ground receiving site for ATC use.
The information required by the ATC facility to perform the airborne surveillance function must be
generated by the aircraft, encoded into the datalink signal, and transmitted.  An example of this
technology is Automatic Dependant Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B), which was successfully
demonstrated on a limited scale during the Safe Flight 21 program2.  The ADS-B system uses
equipment installed in an aircraft to automatically transmit its position and other critical data to
receivers located on the ground or in other aircraft.  ADS-B transmitted information typically
includes the aircraft’s identification, position, altitude, airspeed and whether the aircraft is
3climbing, descending or turning.  In the ADS-B demonstration, aircraft equipped with the
equipment were able to be effectively tracked and separated from other traffic without the use of
primary or secondary radar airborne surveillance systems.  The ADS-B system is discussed in
more detail in section 4.2.
1.4        CURRENT NAS AIRBORNE COMMUNICATION SYSTEM
The airborne communication function is currently implemented in the ATC system using
two primary methods.  The first and most common method is to exchange verbal information
using a two-way radio link.  This method is referred to as voice radio communications.  The
second method is to exchange non-verbal information using a one-way or two-way digital
datalink.  This method is referred to as datalink communications, and is not currently widely used
in the NAS for airborne communications.  These two methods for airborne communication within
the NAS are discussed in the following paragraphs.
1.4.1 Voice Radio Communications
Voice radio communications uses a radio frequency (RF) link between the aircraft and
the ground controller to relay voice communications.  The verbal information is transmitted
between ground-based and aircraft antennas.  The RF link is commonly established in the VHF or
UHF frequency bands for direct line-of-sight (LOS) applications.  The link may also be established
via a relaying satellite for beyond line-of-sight (BLOS) over the horizon applications using satellite
communication (SATCOM) technology.  Voice radio communications links use relatively narrow
bandwidth signals to carry analog or digital voice data between the ground controller and the
aircraft.  The effectiveness of this communication method is dependant upon a number of
parameters such as the RF frequency band, performance characteristics of the ground and
aircraft equipment (primarily transmitters, receivers, and antennas), transmitted power levels,
distance between the transmitting/receiving sites, and environmental conditions.  For SATCOM
communication links, the effectiveness may also be susceptible to interference and high message
4volume.  In general, both LOS and BLOS radio communications links are very effective for
relaying voice information between an aircraft and a ground controller.
1.4.2 Digital Datalink Communications
Datalink communications use a RF link between the aircraft and ground controller to relay
a variety of digital data that may also include voice communications.  The digital information is
also transmitted between ground-based and aircraft antennas using LOS and BLOS RF links.
Datalink communications links typically use larger bandwidth signals to carry encoded digital data
between the ground controller and the aircraft.  The effectiveness of this communication method
is dependant upon the same parameters identified in paragraph 1.4.1 for voice radio
communications.  In general, both LOS and BLOS digital datalink communications links are
effective in relaying very large amounts of information between an aircraft and a ground
controller, with minimal demonstrated system errors.
1.5        CURRENT AIRSPACE CLASSIFICATIONS AND REQUIREMENTS
The NAS is divided into six classes of airspace1.  In each of these classes, specific
operating rules have been established for all aircraft flying in them.  The airspace categories are
Class A, B, C, D, E and G, with the extent of restrictions associated with each class of airspace
ranging from Class A being the most restrictive to Class G having the least operating restrictions.
Each of these airspace classes is discussed in the following paragraphs.  The NAS airspace
classifications are depicted in figure 1-1.
1.5.1 Class A Airspace
Class A airspace includes all areas over the 48 contiguous states and Alaska, and
extends from 18,000 ft MSL (Flight Level 180) to Flight Level (FL) 600.  This airspace is also
referred to as the positive control area (PCA).  Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) 91.135 requires
that every aircraft operating in Class A airspace must operate under Instrument Flight Rules (IFR)
and receive a clearance from ATC.  In addition, the pilot must be rated for instrument flight, the
aircraft must be operated on a route and at an altitude assigned by ATC, and all aircraft must be
5Figure 1-1.  NAS Airspace Classifications1
equipped as specified in FAR 91.215.  In the Class A PCA, air traffic controllers ensure the
positive separation of all aircraft.
1.5.2 Class B Airspace
Class B airspace includes areas surrounding large airports, and extends from the surface
to 10,00 ft MSL.  This airspace is also referred to as a terminal control area (TCA).  The
configuration of each Class B airspace area is individually tailored and consists of a surface area
and two or more layers designed to contain all published instrument procedures associated with
the airport.  An ATC clearance is required for all aircraft operating in the area, and all aircraft
receive separation services from air traffic controllers.  Aircraft may operate in Class B airspace
under both IFR and Visual Flight Rules (VFR), and aircraft can be operated by non instrument-
rated pilots including pilots with a student certificate.  Aircraft must be equipped with appropriate
communication and navigation equipment including a two-way radio, VOR or TACAN navigation
CLASS G
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6capability and a Mode-C transponder.  Exceptions to these requirements may be granted by ATC
on an individual basis.
1.5.3 Class C Airspace
Class C airspace includes areas surrounding medium-sized airports that do not qualify for
a TCA.  Class C airspace evolved from airport radar service areas (ARSA).  Class C airspace
areas are individually tailored and extend from the surface or an intermediate altitude up to
approximately 4,000 ft AGL.  Both IFR and VFR aircraft may operate in Class C airspace, but
must establish communications with the specified air traffic control facility prior to entering.
Aircraft must also be equipped with an operable Mode-C transponder.
1.5.4 Class D Airspace
Class D airspace includes areas surrounding small airports with an operational control
tower, and is also referred to as an airport traffic area (ATA).  The areas are individually tailored,
and include airspace extending from the surface to 2,500 ft AGL.  Both IFR and VFR aircraft may
operate in Class D airspace.  Pilots are required to establish two-way radio communications with
the air traffic control tower prior to entry.  At airports where the control tower does not operate 24
hours a day, the airspace reverts to Class E or G rules when the tower is closed.
1.5.5 Class E Airspace
Class E airspace is controlled airspace that has not been otherwise designated.  Class E
airspace generally has no defined vertical limit, but rather it extends upward to the overlying or
adjacent controlled airspace.  Both IFR and VFR operations are permitted in the airspace, but
only IFR aircraft are required to maintain radio communications with the ATC authority.
1.5.6 Class G Airspace
Class G is uncontrolled airspace within which ATC separation services are not provided
to any aircraft.  Most Class G airspace is located away from major airports below 1,200 ft AGL, or
below 700 ft AGL in the vicinity of certain airports.  Both IFR and VFR operations are permitted in
the airspace.
71.5.7 Special Use Airspace
Special use airspace is designed to accommodate unique aircraft operations or to restrict
or entirely prohibit flight within the specified area.  Special use airspace includes prohibited areas,
restricted areas, warning areas, military operations areas, alert areas, controlled firing areas,
national security areas and temporary flight restriction areas.  Some special use airspace areas
are in effect 24 hours a day, whereas others operate temporarily or part-time and are available for
normal flight operations when they are not active.
82.0 REMOTELY OPERATED AIRCRAFT
2.1        REMOTELY OPERATED AIRCRAFT MISSIONS AND ROLES
Remotely Operated Aircraft (ROA), also referred to as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, are
becoming increasingly common in a variety of roles.  Missions that employ ROA include both
military and civilian applications.  Military and civilian missions and roles for ROA are discussed in
the following paragraphs.
2.1.1 Military ROA Operations
ROA have traditionally been utilized almost exclusively by the military in an intelligence,
reconnaissance and surveillance (ISR) role.  Military ROA have recently expanded their roles to
include tactical strike missions.  Within the NAS, military ROA are currently operated primarily in a
test and demonstration role.  These ROA are normally based from military airfields, and operate
in special use airspace or within very restricted and defined profiles in Class A and Class E
airspace.  In addition to ISR and tactical strike, a number of other roles are being explored and
developed for military ROA.  These roles include battlespace management, real-time targeting
and bomb damage assessment, area missile defense, communications relay, suppression of
enemy air defenses, mine countermeasures, counter drug operations, search and rescue,
nuclear, biological and chemical weapons detection sampling and psychological operations.3
Military flight operations associated with these expanded roles may extend beyond merely testing
and demonstrating the ROA, and have the potential for long-term operational activities within the
NAS.  In particular, the recent domestic terrorism incidents on 11 September 2001 have raised
the possibility of extensive military ROA operations in the NAS to monitor and defend domestic
locations.  Domestic locations that might require long-term support from military ROA operating in
the NAS include major cities or high-value assets such as military or Government installations,
power plants, bridges or dams, ports, airports or stadiums.
92.1.2 Civilian ROA Operations
In addition to military considerations, civilian ROA supporting both research and
commercial activities have been proposed for a wide variety of future support roles.  These roles
include communications relay, environmental surveillance and monitoring (of weather, traffic,
wildlife, plants, natural resources or natural disasters), law enforcement, firefighting, and other
mapping and sensing functions.4  Civilian ROA will likely be based from non-military airfields, and
may require the ability to operate in all airspace categories.
The varied missions and roles of future military and civilian ROA will require many
different types of ROA.  These ROA will operate over a wide range of mission parameters,
including altitudes, airspeed, time on station, and range.  ROA will become much more
commonplace in the NAS, and be required to operate efficiently and safely among manned
aircraft with a minimum of restrictions.
2.2        ROA OPERATIONAL ELEMENTS
The use of military or civilian ROA in the NAS has several unique operating elements that
must be considered when compared to typical general aviation, corporate or commercial
passenger and cargo aircraft.  A number of issues are related to the fact that no human operator
is onboard the aircraft.  The human operator that is responsible for monitoring and actively
controlling the ROA is located at a remote ground location.  The characteristic flight profiles that
ROA need to fly due to their unique mission requirements also presents a number of operational
issues.  Potential safety issues with unmanned aircraft operating in proximity to manned and
other unmanned aircraft must also be considered.   Relevant operational elements that must be
taken into account to conduct safe and efficient large-scale ROA operations within the NAS are
discussed in the following paragraphs.
2.2.1 See And Avoid
The first ROA operating element that must be considered is the inability of the remote
operator of an ROA to effectively “see and avoid” potentially conflicting aircraft or other hazards
10
while operating within the NAS.  The ability to detect and avoid other traffic is a fundamental
requirement for any aircraft operating under VFR.  ROA are more likely to operate under IFR.
While operating IFR in Class E airspace, the ROA must be able to detect and avoid VFR aircraft.
Under current FAR rules, the ability to see and avoid is not specifically required while operating in
a Class A airspace PCA.  In a PCA, all aircraft must operate under IFR and are separated from
one another by ATC.   Even when not required for a particular airspace and operating categories,
the ability to effectively see and avoid airborne traffic or other hazards provides an additional
measure of safety.
The ROA operator has no direct way to visually detect hazards and subsequently
implement appropriate actions to correct an undesirable situation such as a midair collision or
flight through severe weather.  A coalition of government, university and industry researchers
recently demonstrated the ability to effectively detect and avoid other traffic on a Scaled
Composites Proteus ROA5.  The demonstration used technology similar to Traffic-alert Collision
Avoidance System (TCAS) as well as passive sensors on the host vehicle to detect the
approaching traffic so that the remote operator was able to maneuver the ROA away from a
collision course.  The primary sensor used in the Proteus flight test was the Goodrich Skywatch
HP traffic advisory system.  This system is also being integrated onto the General Atomics
Predator-B ROA for a future capability demonstration6.
In general, ROA need to be able to employ both “cooperative” and “non-cooperative”
means to detect and image other aircraft to operate effectively in the NAS.  Cooperative means
requires the use of active systems on both the ROA and the other aircraft.  Examples of
cooperative technologies are TCAS and Automatic Dependent Surveillance- Broadcast (ADS-B).
Non-cooperative means requires the ROA to be equipped with sensors capable of detecting and
determining the location of the other aircraft, with no dedicated equipment required on the other
aircraft.  Examples of sensors providing a non-cooperative means of detection include radar or
infrared systems to image aircraft not equipped with a transponder or ADS-B system.  One issue
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with using the vehicles onboard sensors is ensuring the systems have sufficient scan volume to
detect traffic that may be approaching the ROA from above, below, either side or from behind.
2.2.2 Mission Profiles
A second ROA operating element to consider is the mission profiles typically flown by an
ROA and the airspace required for that profile.  Depending on their mission requirements and
specific operational roles, ROA will employ a variety of flight profiles and mission “on-station”
times with a wide range of corresponding airspace usage.  Mission profiles include “racetrack” or
“point-to-point” type routes that may cover small or very large geographic areas.  Missions may
be constrained to a single or very narrow span of altitudes, or may cover a wide range of altitudes
throughout the mission.  Certain ROA missions may have corresponding flight profiles that would
require IFR operations in Class E airspace where VFR traffic is congested.  Other missions may
involve flight through Class B, C or D airspace around airports.  Most ROA mission profiles will be
able to operate IFR in a Class A PCA above FL 180.
ROA currently operate in the NAS either in restricted areas, or must use an exclusive
“block” of airspace assigned by the air traffic controller.  This block includes a specific altitude or
range of altitudes and designated geographic operating boundaries.  No other aircraft are allowed
to enter this assigned block of airspace.  ROA operating in Class E and in some cases Class A
airspace are frequently accompanied by a manned safety chase aircraft to provide direct
communications with ATC and to maintain a visual traffic lookout.  As military and especially
civilian ROA proliferate within the NAS, this inefficient exclusive use of airspace and restrictive
procedural requirements will not be practicable.  In addition, many of the missions and roles being
considered for ROA in the NAS will involve long-duration flights, and will require flexible airspace
assignments to accommodate real-time changes in flight profiles and operating parameters.
2.2.3 Remote Operator
Another unique operating element is that an ROA has no onboard pilot in control of the
aircraft.  The remote operator is not in “direct” control of the aircraft, and may not be able to
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quickly and effectively modify the vehicles flight parameters or communicate with an air traffic
controller or other aircraft.  In addition, the remote operator must be sufficiently qualified and
trained to fly the vehicle and to interface with the ATC system.  These elements are critical to
maintaining the safety and efficiency of ROA in the NAS, and are discussed in the following
paragraphs.
2.2.3.1 Vehicle Command and Control
The operating procedures and protocols for aircraft flying in the NAS presume that the
pilot in control of the aircraft can take rapid and decisive action either independently, or as
directed by the controller to maintain the safety of that aircraft within the system.  In an ROA, the
pilot in control is remotely located, and is only able to receive vehicle status and ATC information
via the system’s command and control datalink.  The time it takes the remote operator to receive
vehicle status and ATC information delays the initiation of an appropriate vehicle response.  In
the Global Hawk ROA described in section 2.3.2, the one-way delay in the LOS datalink is
approximately one to three seconds, while the one-way delay for the UHF SATCOM datalink
ranges from two to four seconds7.
Once the remote operator receives the vehicle status or ATC information, the vehicle
response must be initiated.  In most ROA systems including Global Hawk, the remote operator
does not directly manipulate the vehicle’s flight controls, but rather interfaces with the vehicle’s
autopilot.  The vehicle’s onboard computer guidance systems calculate appropriate flight control
inputs.  If the remote operator receives an ATC request to modify a particular flight parameter, the
operator must indirectly complete the action by re-programming the autopilot or modifying the
current mission data rather than simply moving a flight control.  In the Global Hawk system, the
operator must take “override” control of the vehicle and reprogram the desired parameter.7  For
simple modifications such as altitude changes, it requires 3-5 seconds to reprogram the
parameter.  For a more complicated modification such as heading or ground track changes, it
may require 10 seconds or more to updated the autopilot or mission data.  The one-way datalink
delay is then encountered again as the commands are uplinked to the ROA.  The operational and
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flight safety impacts resulting from the total delay in ROA vehicle response must be considered
during situations involving vehicle system failures or airborne traffic conflicts.
2.2.3.2 Vehicle Communications
The operating procedures and protocols for aircraft flying in the NAS also presume that
the pilot in control of the aircraft can readily communicate with the air traffic controller and other
aircraft.  For an ROA, the remote operator is “indirectly” linked to the aircraft and to
communications with the air traffic controller or other aircraft.  If it becomes necessary for the air
traffic controller to confirm or modify the ROA flight parameters, or if the remote operator desires
to change the ROA’s current flight parameters (due to mission considerations or vehicle
problems), the air traffic controller and ROA remote operator must communicate via an indirect
method.  Any delay in communications between the air traffic controller and the ROA remote
operator will result in increased response times.
2.2.3.3 Operator Qualification and Training
To operate an ROA in the NAS, the FAA requires a Certificate of Authorization (COA).
The COA specifies required operating procedures and conditions, including pilot qualifications.
Current COAs being issued by the FAA require an instrument-rated pilot to be in control of an
ROA while operating in the NAS.8  There are no additional ROA-specific training, currency or
experience requirements for the remote operator.  An instrument-rated pilot will have completed
substantial training and certification activities, and will have a general knowledge and
understanding of ATC procedures and protocols.  This general background of knowledge is
necessary to safely and efficiently operate in the NAS without adversely impacting the ATC
system or other aircraft.
2.2.4 System Design and Installed Equipment
A final ROA operating element that must be considered is the ROA overall system design
features and installed equipment.  To function effectively in the NAS, FAA functional and
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regulatory requirements must be incorporated into the ROA system.  These considerations are
discussed in the following paragraphs.
2.2.4.1 ROA Design Requirements
The key requirement is high reliability, which requires double or triple redundancy on
critical vehicle systems and no single-point failure modes.  These features are not typically found
to a large extent on a military ROA due to the increased cost and complexity.  An ROA that is
intended to operate in the NAS substantially outside of restricted airspace must be specifically
designed with a very high level of reliability to be able to meet FAA design and certification
requirements.  The FAA’s final certification requirements for ROA may in fact exceed the
reliability and redundancy requirements currently specified for manned aircraft due to
uncertainties and conservatism with this new class of aircraft.  The ROA will also have to be
designed to respond to system degradations and failures with an acceptable, non-catastrophic
response.  For example, the loss of the datalink to the ground controller must result in a
controlled and safe autonomous recovery at an acceptable location.
2.2.4.2 ROA Equipment Requirements
ROA are also relatively sensitive to avionics weight, volume, thermal (cooling) and
electrical requirements.  ROA typically do not have a large margin to accommodate additional
communication, navigation and surveillance (CNS) equipment that may be required to operate
within the NAS.  Any additional equipment the ROA is required to carry must be interoperable
with all of the types and classes of unmanned aircraft.  These types and classes range from
small, tactical or regional systems with short endurances and a limited ability to accommodate
CNS avionics to large, strategic or broad-area systems with long endurances and extensive
avionics support capability.
2.3        REMOTELY OPERATED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS
Two ROA systems that are currently operated by the military are discussed in the
following paragraphs.  These include the RQ-1 Predator, which is representative of current
15
medium altitude-endurance (MAE) vehicles, and the RQ-4A Global Hawk, which is representative
of current high altitude-endurance (HAE) vehicles.
2.3.1 RQ-1 Predator ROA
The General Atomics Predator-A is a propeller-driven medium-altitude, medium
endurance vehicle with a published range of 400 NM and endurance of 24 hours, and operating
altitude of 25,000 ft.  The RQ-1A Predator aircraft is shown in figure 2-1.  The vehicle is 27 ft long,
has a wingspan of 49 ft and can carry up to 450 lbs of payload.  Payloads include synthetic
aperture radar (SAR), electro-optical sensors and a forward-looking infrared (FLIR) sensor.  It is
equipped with both a LOS datalink and a BLOS SATCOM datalink.
The Predator-A was designed for military use only, and has a number of single-point
failures and inadequate reliability that precludes its effective transition to a commercial platform
with extensive operations in the NAS.6  A follow-on Predator-B version is under development in
response to increased military mission requirements and potential civil missions.  The RQ-1B
Predator-B aircraft, shown in figure 2-2, is prop-jet powered and has 50% more payload capacity,
higher operating speeds, and an operating ceiling of 45,000 ft.  The B-model has been designed
with no single-point failures and with a much higher reliability rating and is intended to meet FAA
certification requirements.
2.3.1.1 Predator Command and Control System
The Predator uses a multi-ROA, multi-payload control common ground station
manufactured by General Atomics9.  It uses a C-band LOS datalink for direct control of the
aircraft and passing of real-time payload data at ranges up to 150 NM.  In addition, a Ku-band
satellite datalink allows for over-the-horizon operations.  The ground control station can be
configured as a vehicle-mounted or mobile system for tactical use on the battlefield or at sea,
respectively.  The Predator ground station operators console is shown in figure 2-3.
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Figure 2-1.  RQ-1A Predator Aircraft
Figure 2-2.  RQ-1B Predator-B Aircraft
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Figure 2-3.  Predator Ground Control Station
The ground station embeds the vehicle’s UHF/VHF radio communications into both the
LOS and BLOS datalinks, enabling the remote operator to effectively maintain radio
communications with the other aircraft or ground stations in the vicinity of the aircraft.
2.3.2 RQ-4A Global Hawk ROA
The Northrop-Grumman Global Hawk is a jet-powered high-altitude, long-endurance vehicle with
a published range of 13,500 NM, endurance of 36 hours and operating altitude of 65,000 ft.  The
vehicle is 44 ft long, has a wingspan of 116 ft and a gross takeoff weight of 25,600 lbs.  The RQ-
4A Global Hawk aircraft is shown in figure 2-4.  It can carry up to 2,000 lbs of payload, including
high-resolution SAR with a moving target indicator mode, electro-optical sensors and infrared
sensors.  Global Hawk is equipped with both a wide bandwidth LOS datalink and two BLOS
SATCOM datalinks.  The BLOS datalinks include a Ku-band wide-bandwidth system and a UHF-
band narrow bandwidth Common Data Link System.  All three datalinks are used for command
and control of the vehicle.  In addition, the wide bandwidth LOS and Ku-band BLOS datalinks
embed voice radio communications into the link, enabling the local air traffic controller to maintain
LOS communications with the vehicle that are then linked back to the remote ground controller
via the datalink.
18
Figure 2-4.  RQ-4A Global Hawk Aircraft
The Global Hawk ground control segment consist of two elements, the launch and
recovery element (LRE) and the mission control element (MCE).10  The LRE uses the LOS
datalink, and must be co-located with the aircraft at its operating base.  The MCE communicates
with the aircraft and LRE through the SATCOM datalinks, and can be located anywhere in the
world.
2.3.2.1 Global Hawk Launch Recovery Element
The LRE is used to launch and recover the Global Hawk.  It verifies the health and status
of the various subsystems aboard the vehicle, receives the mission plan from the MCE and loads
it into the aircraft.  During launch and recover, the LRE is responsible for air vehicle management,
coordination with local and en route traffic control facilities, and hand-off of the aircraft to the MCE
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once airborne.  The takeoff and landing sequence is automatically executed with assistance from
differential Global Positioning System (GPS) inputs.
2.3.2.2 Global Hawk Mission Control Element
The MCE provides for management of the aircraft and its sensors.  The MCE is operated
by four persons, responsible for the command and control, mission planning, imagery quality
control, and communications functions of the system.  The MCE has the ability to control up to
three Global Hawks simultaneously and disseminate near real-time information anywhere in the
world.  The operator of the MCE does not directly interface with the vehicle’s flight controls.  If
changes are required to the preplanned mission data currently being executed, the updates are
uplinked to the vehicle, and the vehicle determines the appropriate flight control commands to
execute the updated mission route.
2.4        ROA GROUND STATION SYSTEMS
There are several different types of ROA ground stations either in use or in development.
All are from military or Government research ROA systems, as the civilian ROA currently under
discussion have not evolved beyond their military roots.  For this discussion, ROA ground station
types are divided into two categories: tactical systems for short-range ROA, and strategic
systems for long-range ROA.  These two general types are discussed below, followed by a
specific discussion of the joint military Tactical Control Station (TCS), which is currently in
development to support a broad range of current and future Army, Air Force and Navy/Marine
Corps ROA.
2.4.1 Tactical Ground Control Stations
Tactical ground control stations support short-to-medium range ROA in a confined
tactical environment.  They generally rely primarily on LOS datalinks to the ROA, although some
may also feature a BLOS SATCOM datalink for limited over-the-horizon operations.  Tactical
ground control stations tend to provide the operator with a higher degree of real-time authority
over the ROA including the ability to manually “fly” the vehicle.  Although many tasks and the
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even the mission route may be automated, this type of ground control station typically requires
the operator to exercise more manual oversight and control of the ROA.
2.4.2 Strategic Ground Control Stations
Strategic ground control stations support medium-to-long endurance ROA in a regional or
trans-regional environment.  They generally rely primarily on BLOS SATCOM datalinks to the
ROA for extensive over-the-horizon operations, although most also feature a LOS datalink for the
limited local operations such as takeoffs and recoveries.  Strategic ground control stations tend to
automate most vehicle activities, and provide the operator with limited real-time authority over the
ROA.  The mission route and most flight/payload activities are pre-planned and executed
autonomously during the mission.  The operator will typically have the ability to make real-time
modifications to the pre-planned route and mission tasks, but has no capability to manipulate the
flight controls and manually “fly” the vehicle.
2.4.3 Tactical Control System
The TCS is an ROA ground control station under development by Raytheon and the Joint
Forces Command.  It is designed to provide the military services with a single ground station for
the command and control of a range of present and future tactical and medium range ROA and
their payloads.  In addition, TCS can also be used for data processing, export and dissemination
to designated command, control, communication, computers and intelligence systems.  TCS
provides for five levels of interaction with a particular ROA.  Level 1 is the indirect receipt and
direct retransmission of imagery or data.  Level 2 is the receipt of imagery or data directly from
the ROA plus the functionality of Level 1.  Level 3 is the control of the ROA payload plus the
functionality of the previous levels.  Level 4 is the control of the ROA, less takeoff and landing,
plus the functionality of the previous levels.  Level 5 is the full functionality and control of the ROA
from takeoff to landing.
The TCS contains four high-resolution computer screens that show terrain data in the
vicinity of the operating vehicle, a forward view of the vehicle’s flight, and what the sensors are
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viewing.  The remote operator pilot occupies the left seat, and can switch between several
vehicles under the station’s control.  The payload operator occupies the right seat and controls
the sensors installed in the vehicles.  The TCS operators console is shown in figure 2-5.
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Figure 2-5.  Tactical Control Station Operators Station
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3.0 CURRENT ROA-NAS INTEGRATION
3.1        CURRENT ROA AIRBORNE SURVEILLANCE IMPLEMENTATIONS
To operate in the NAS, ROA are required to be equipped for airborne surveillance the
same as manned aircraft.  The equipment required depends on the airspace category and flight
rules under which the ROA will be operating.   The following paragraphs describe the current
ROA airborne surveillance implementations in the applicable airspace categories and flight rules.
The descriptions are for military ROA that are currently in operational use and have significant
flight experience in the NAS.
3.1.1 Restricted Airspace
While operating in restricted special-use airspace, ROA are subject to the military
authorities and Using Agencies responsible for the area.  ROA operating from military facilities
within restricted airspace normally are equipped with transponder equipment to facilitate
secondary radar ground surveillance tracking.  The Using Agency controls and deconflicts all
aircraft operating in the restricted airspace.
One procedure widely used by military ROA staging from military facilities inside of
restricted airspace is to take off from the military field, climb above FL 180 in the restricted area,
then depart the restricted area and enter the Class A PCA8.  In the example of Global Hawk, the
aircraft normally climbs to above FL 450 before departing to minimize the potential for conflicts
with other IFR traffic.  Global Hawk is then tracked using its transponder and separated from
other traffic using normal ATC procedures.  In the example of Predator, the aircraft takes off and
climbs in the restricted airspace, then is joined by a chase aircraft before leaving the restricted
area and entering the Class A or E controlled airspace.
3.1.2 Class E Airspace / Visual Flight Rules
Class E airspace extends from 1,200 ft AGL to FL 180, and includes both IFR and VFR
traffic.  To operate in Class E airspace under VFR, aircraft are not required to be equipped with
any transponder equipment, but must be able to “see and avoid” any other traffic.  No ROA are
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currently operated under VFR in Class E airspace.  ROA operating under IFR in Class E airspace
are equipped with a transponder, and are normally escorted by manned aircraft to maintain a
“see and avoid” capability.  The manned aircraft is able to detect and identify any conflicting
traffic, and is in communication with both the air traffic controller and the remote operator of the
ROA.
3.1.3 Positive Controlled Airspace / Instrument Flight Rules
The Class A PCA extends from FL 180 to FL 600, and includes only IFR operations.  In
the PCA, all aircraft must be equipped with an altitude-encoded Mode-C transponder, and are
positively tracked and separated by ATC.  Depending upon the requirements of the ROA’s COA,
it may operate like any other manned traffic, or it may require a chase aircraft.  Aircraft in the PCA
are not required to detect other traffic, although that is generally regarded as an effective and
assumed safety backup to positive ATC control.
3.2        CURRENT ROA AIRBORNE COMMUNICATION IMPLEMENTATIONS
To operate in the NAS, ROA are required to be in constant communication with the
cognizant ATC authority.  This includes the Controlling Agency (en route center or approach
control) and Using Agency for restricted areas if applicable.  For the military ROA currently in use,
this is primarily accomplished via a UHF and/or VHF radio for voice communications.  The radio
communications between the vehicle and remote operator are “embedded” into the ROA’s
command and control datalink.  This allows the air traffic controller to establish radio
communications directly with the unmanned vehicle in the local airspace, and the radio
communications are then relayed to the remote operator via the ROA’s LOS or BLOS datalink.
This arrangement precludes any changes in local ATC equipment or procedures to communicate
with ROA in the local airspace.  For BLOS SATCOM datalinks, this technique may result in a
noticeable lag in the communications cycle.  For the Global Hawk ROA discussed in section
2.3.2, the two-way delay in the LOS datalink is approximately 3-5 seconds, while the two-way
delay for the UHF SATCOM command and control datalink is 5-7 seconds.7  The voice
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transmissions themselves are similar in quality to a standard radio.  ATC communications with an
ROA that has their radio communications embedded in the datalink are functionally similar to
communications with a manned vehicle, and have comparable sound quality.8
In addition to voice radio, a telephone land-line is typically pre-arranged for direct
communications between the ROA remote operator and the Controlling Agency.7, 8  Telephone
communications are also used for critical situations such as the loss of the embedded radio link
or entire command and control datalink.  Setup and implementation of this telephone backup
capability requires substantial preflight coordination, and would not be practicable for extensive
ROA operations in the NAS.
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4.0 AIRBORNE DATALINK SYSTEMS
4.1        AIRBORNE DATALINK SYSTEMS OPERATION
There are a number of different types of digital datalinks that may be employed in an
ROA to implement the airborne surveillance and communication functions.  Datalinks are
generally divided into either terrestrial-based or satellite-based systems.  For each of these, their
potential for use in supporting the airborne surveillance and communication functions with an
ROA in the NAS is discussed in the following sections.  For the airborne surveillance function, the
digital datalink is only used to downlink aircraft information to the ATC receiving site.  For the
airborne communication function, a two-way datalink would be used to carry information between
the ATC ground site and the ROA.  This information would in turn be relayed to the remote
operator via the ROA two-way ground station datalink.
4.1.1 Terrestrial-Based Datalink Systems
Terrestrial-based systems use ground stations to transmit/receive the datalink signals
and relay them to ATC facilities.  Terrestrial-based datalink systems can only be used for airborne
surveillance where there is line-of-sight from the aircraft to the ground receiving station.  They
include the Mode Select (Mode S) Extended Squitter, the Universal Access Transceiver and the
VHF Data Link (VDL) Mode 3 and Mode 4.11
4.1.2 Satellite-Based Datalink Systems
Satellite-based systems relay the datalink signals directly to ATC facilities via a
communications satellite.  SATCOM datalink systems can be used for airborne surveillance
anywhere satellite coverage exists, since there is no line-of-sight requirement to an established
ground receiving station.  This is particularly applicable to airborne surveillance over oceanic or
most isolated regions.  Some areas such as the polar regions may have limited SATCOM
coverage, although the NAS over the 48 contiguous states has excellent coverage.
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4.2        AUTOMATIC DEPENDENT SURVEILLANCE - BROADCAST
The ADS-B system is one datalink technology under development that may be used by
an ROA to implement the airborne surveillance function in the NAS.  ADS-B uses equipment
installed in an aircraft to automatically transmit its position and other critical data to receivers
located on the ground or in other aircraft.  ADS-B technology allows the position of an aircraft to
be determined much more precisely, and is effective in remote or mountainous areas where
current primary or secondary radar-based surveillance systems are ineffective.  ADS-B
transmitted information typically includes the aircraft’s identification, position, altitude, airspeed
and whether the aircraft is climbing, descending or turning.  This information is broadcast to
receivers located at ATC ground stations (air-ground) or onboard other ADS-B equipped aircraft
(air-air) via a digital datalink.  For the air-ground application of ADS-B, the datalink information
may be used by an ATC facility to execute the airborne surveillance function.
ADS-B uses the satellite-based GPS to determine the aircraft’s precise three-dimensional
position.  This position information is then combined with the other aircraft information, encoded
into a digital format, and transmitted from the aircraft on a discrete frequency.  The information is
typically updated several times per second to provide an accurate, real-time depiction of the
aircraft’s status.  When all aircraft operating in the area are equipped with ADS-B, the system
provides the same real-time information to the air traffic controller and all other aircraft within the
area, enabling a comprehensive and integrated method for implementing the airborne
surveillance function.
ATC ground sites and other aircraft are able to receive the ADS-B signal transmitted from
an aircraft at ranges in excess of 100 miles.  This range allows conflict detection and resolution
with a much greater margin than is currently available with a radar-based surveillance system.
ADS-B is also not subject to the “dynamic lag” found in radar systems.  As the aircraft changes
airspeed, altitude or heading, the ADS-B system is immediately updated, and current and
accurate parameters are transmitted real-time.  In a radar system, aircraft parameter changes
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can only be detected after several radar data samples are collected; the radar-derived
parameters always lag behind the aircraft’s current state.
To implement the airborne surveillance function using ADS-B, only a one-way datalink is
required which transmits the information from the aircraft to a ground station.  To include the
airborne communication function, a two-way datalink will be required.  The digital information
transmitted from the aircraft will consist of the ADS-B signal and also include voice or text
communications.  The signal transmitted from the ground ATC facility to the aircraft will include
voice or text information only.  In this system, no voice radio communications or radar will be
required to execute the primary airborne communications and surveillance functions, respectively.
Voice radio and primary/secondary radar systems may still be used as a backup to the datalink-
based implementation.
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5.0 ROA DATALINK SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION IN THE NAS
5.1        AIRBORNE SURVEILLANCE FUNCTIONAL IMPLEMENTATION
The airborne surveillance function for an ROA operating in the NAS can most effectively
be executed via a digital datalink.  The implementation of this proposed system is discussed in
the following sections.
5.1.1 System Operation
An airborne surveillance system for an ROA using a digital datalink will require dedicated
equipment on both the ROA and the ground-based ATC facility.  The system can most effectively
be executed via a LOS terrestrial-based datalink, although LOS to the ATC facility where the air
traffic controller is located is not required if a SATCOM datalink is utilized.  The system will
require a network of ground receiving sites that are linked back to the ATC facility.  The ROA will
require dedicated datalink equipment to generate and transmit the datalink messages.  The GPS-
INS navigation system typically used in an ROA will provide the necessary position information
and accuracy required by the controller.  Messages should include the vehicle’s identification,
position, altitude, airspeed and whether the aircraft is climbing, descending or turning.  Additional
communication information that may be included in the downlinked message is discussed in
section 5.1.2.
The message broadcast rate and the latency of the information included in the message
must be considered.  The minimum message broadcast rate and maximum data latencies should
be specified in the FAR requirements for the system, and may depend on the particular airspace
area.  Broadcast rate and data latency, as well as the minimum accuracy of the position
information transmitted by the ROA are critical characteristics that impact the minimum spacing
requirements for traffic deconfliction.
The datalink messages from all manned and unmanned aircraft operating in an area will
be received by the ATC ground equipment.  The information will be processed, and the position
and status of each aircraft will be displayed on the air traffic controller’s equipment.  The data will
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enable the controller to verify aircraft are deconflicted, and if necessary establish positive
separation between each aircraft in the area.
5.1.2 System Feasibility
Datalink technologies to enable the airborne surveillance function are available and
proven.  Equipment that would be installed in the ROA and the ground ATC equipment are under
development.  ADS-B proof-of-concept technologies have been successfully demonstrated on a
limited scale in manned aircraft as discussed in section 1.3.  For wide-scale use of a system such
as ADS-B for all aircraft operating in controlled airspace, the aircraft and ground-based systems
will have to be further developed and refined.  In particular, ROA-specific datalink and processing
systems will need to be developed that are compatible with ROA environments and other
installed systems.  For an ADS-B type of datalink-based airborne surveillance system to be
widely used in the NAS, its reliability and consistent performance will have to be extensively
tested and demonstrated.
5.1.3 Human Factors Considerations
To transition to a datalink-based system for airborne surveillance, human factors issues
for the ATC controller and ROA remote operator must be considered.  From the ground ATC
perspective, the initial transition from the current reliance on a radar-based system will be subtle.
In general, the types of information provided to the controller will be the same as is currently
available, although the system may include additional useful data such as real-time maneuvering
information (i.e., whether the aircraft is in a climb, descent or turn).  The position and velocity data
provided to the controller will also be more accurate and timely than what would be provided by
primary or secondary radar, allowing reduced separation minimums to be applied.
The more significant change for the air traffic controller will be the subsequent transition
to a Free Flight environment that is enabled in part by a datalink-based system such as ADS-B.
In this ATC environment, the controller must become more of an air traffic manager, and is
primarily responsible for verifying the safe separation of aircraft rather than actively applying
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positive separation protocols.  The manned and unmanned aircraft assume the primary
responsibility for their own flight routes and maintaining safe separation from nearby aircraft.
From the ROA remote operator perspective, the initial transition from a radar-based to a
datalink-based airborne surveillance system will also be subtle.  The protocols for operating in a
particular class of airspace will likely change little, and any changes made will probably not effect
the remote operator significantly.  Flights will be planned and executed procedurally very similar
to the current system.  As the full benefits of a datalink-based system such as ADS-B are
exercised in the transition to a Free Flight environment, the human factors considerations for the
ROA remote operator will be profound.
In a Free Flight environment, the ROA remote operator assumes primary responsibility
for monitoring nearby traffic and ensuring safe separation between the ROA being controlled and
other aircraft.  The operator must constantly monitor the ground station displays for traffic and
ROA vehicle status, just as the pilot of a manned aircraft would.  The operator must be prepared
to intervene if necessary to deconflict with other traffic.  The Free Flight environment also gives
the remote operator significant flexibility in controlling the ROA route of flight, including making
real-time modifications to the preplanned route.  The operator is not constrained by the
established airway system that is currently in use, and can execute the flight as desired to satisfy
the specific mission objectives.  The remote operators ground station must be designed to
optimize the operators situational awareness of the vehicles health and status, the current
mission parameters, and the current position and relevant status of other airborne traffic or
weather hazards.
5.2        AIRBORNE COMMUNICATION FUNCTIONAL IMPLEMENTATION
The airborne communication function for an ROA operating in the NAS can most
effectively be executed via a digital datalink.  This ATC datalink between the ground-based ATC
facility and the airborne ROA may be implemented via a terrestrial-based or satellite-based
system.  The features of this proposed system are discussed in the following sections.
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5.2.1 System Operation
Implementation of the airborne communication function will be accomplished using the
ROA’s command and control and ATC datalinks.  Information passed between the remote
operator and the air traffic controller will include verbal and textual information.  Significant
amounts of data may be efficiently and accurately transferred in a textual format.  For time-critical
communications, the datalinks should continue to permit verbal information to be transferred
between the remote operator and the controller.  Two-way communications between the remote
operator and ROA will be embedded into the existing LOS and BLOS SATCOM command and
control datalinks.  Two-way communications between the ROA and the ATC ground site will be
embedded into the ATC datalink.
5.2.2 System Feasibility
The technology required to incorporate verbal and textual communications into a two-way
datalink is available and proven.  Military ROA systems currently feature verbal communications
between the ROA vehicle and the remote operators ground station via LOS and SATCOM
datalinks.  The addition of non-verbal textual messages to the communications datalink is
relatively simple and has been successfully demonstrated.  The significant change from the
current airborne communications implementation is the equipment required and a shift towards
more non-verbal communications to effectively transfer greater amounts of information.
5.2.3 Human Factors Considerations
Executing the airborne communication function for an ROA via a digital datalink has
several human factor issues that must be considered.  First, the use of a datalink will enable
textual as well as verbal information to be communicated between the air traffic controller and the
ROA remote operator.  Both the controller and the remote operator will have to be trained in the
effective use of textual communications, and will have to develop the skills required to generate
and interpret these non-verbal messages.  Non-verbal communications can also transfer larger
quantities of data at a much higher rate than verbal communications, resulting in an increased
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amount of time to process and act upon the information received.  The datalink system, including
controller and remote operator work stations, must be designed to enable efficient creation,
transmission and assimilation of the textual information, and ensure the maximum quantities and
rates of data communicated do not overload the human involved.
In addition, the use of a datalink will increase the overall transmission delays and signal
latencies in the communications process.  As was discussed in section 3.2, this will more likely be
evident in a BLOS SATCOM datalink.  Appropriate procedures, training and experience will be
required for both the ROA remote operator and ATC to accommodate this phenomenon and
achieve safe and efficient communications.  The datalink technologies and controller and remote
operator workstations must be designed to facilitate efficient communications, and minimize the
systemic latencies in the communications process.
5.3        DATALINK / ROA SYSTEM INTEGRATION
There are several areas that must be considered to integrate an ATC datalink system
similar to ADS-B into an ROA to implement the airborne surveillance and communication
functions.  These areas are discussed in the following sections.
5.3.1 Datalink Technology and Equipment
The type of datalink technology and equipment selected to implement the ATC functions
will depend in part on the ROA mission requirements.  For an ROA operating within LOS to the
ground ATC facilities, a terrestrial datalink will be acceptable.  For an ROA operating in remote
areas, a SATCOM datalink may be required.  In most situations, the ROA will remain within LOS
range to the ATC’s ground datalink receiving sites and can use a simpler terrestrial-based
datalink.  This will normally be the case even if the ROA is operating at long distances from the
remote operator and being controlled via a BLOS SATCOM datalink.
The ROA command and control datalink to the remote ground operator and the ATC
datalink for airborne surveillance and communication will have to operate simultaneously without
mutual interference.  The two-way datalinks will either have to be deconflicted (by using different
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frequencies or multiplexing), or may be fully integrated into a single multi-use datalink.  An
integrated multi-use datalink may alleviate some of the concern with the limited ability of an ROA
to accommodate additional equipment, as was discussed in section 2.2.4.2.
Hardware comprising the ADS-B-like surveillance and communication system will be
installed in both the vehicle and the remote operator ground station.  This equipment includes an
operators display, control panel/data entry unit, processing units, and a datalink transponder and
antenna.  The operators display and control panel/data entry unit may be fully integrated with the
displays and interface controls already incorporated into the ground station.  In addition,
significant processing capability is already available on the ground station.  The datalink
transponder and antenna, and an onboard processing unit will be installed on the ROA.  The
onboard processing unit will control the overall system transmit and receive functions, and
process the information and messages to be transmitted.  Received messages will be downlinked
to the ground station, with very little onboard pre-processing required.
5.3.2 System Implementation
The ROA surveillance and communication system will include an air-ground
capability similar to ADS-B to implement the airborne surveillance and communication functions.
The ATC datalink will be capable of carrying voice and text messages between the air traffic
controller and the ROA, and will broadcast position and status information messages to ATC
ground receiving sites.  The ROA’s information will be included on the ATC display along with
other aircraft in the sector.  The air traffic controller can then monitor and positively deconflict the
traffic.  If the ROA is required by the controller to change its flight parameters, a verbal or non-
verbal communication will be included in the ATC uplink to the ROA.  The communication will
then be then relayed to the remote operator via the command and control datalink.  If the remote
operator desires to change the ROA’s flight parameters or report a change in vehicle or mission
status, this verbal or textual message can be generated at the ground station, then transmitted to
the ATC receiving site via the ROA’s command and control and ATC datalinks.
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In addition, the surveillance and communication system should include an air-air
capability similar to ADS-B.  This will enable an effective detect and avoid capability with other
properly configured aircraft.  The system will receive other aircraft’s position information
broadcasts.  These received messages will be downlinked to the ground control station,
processed, and displayed on the ground station’s traffic information display.  The remote operator
will be able to identify potential traffic conflicts, determine an appropriate avoidance response,
and send the necessary control commands to the ROA.
5.4        NAS INTEGRATION OF DATALINK-BASED SURVEILLANCE/COMMUNICATION
SYSTEM
5.4.1 Transition From Current System
In the current airborne surveillance and communication systems, a combination of
primary and secondary radar is used to positively identify an aircraft and establish its position and
altitude, while communications are conducted using a voice radio link.  Introduction of a datalink-
based system for these functions will require a phased approach as ground and aircraft
equipment is installed, effective procedures and protocols are developed, and the reliability and
performance of the system is proven.
During the transition period to datalink-based surveillance and communication functions,
updated ATC procedures must be in place to address the mixed equipage and associated
differences in capabilities.  ROA that are configured with an ADS-B-like datalink system with
embedded communications capability will be operating together with manned and unmanned
aircraft equipped with a transponder and voice radio.  The transitional ATC system should be
configured to exploit the advantages and additional capabilities of datalink-equipped aircraft to the
greatest extent practicable.
The transition to a datalink-based system for airborne surveillance such as ADS-B will
provide an immediate alternative for the basic functions of aircraft identification and position and
altitude verification.  During the introduction of the new technology, primary and secondary radar
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systems may continue to be used, and the higher level capabilities provided by the ATC datalink
implemented in stages.  In this transition period, modifications to ATC equipment will allow
datalinked and radar contacts to be displayed together for the controller, permitting aircraft with
mixed equipage to be accommodated in the same airspace.
The transition to a datalink-based system for airborne communication will provide a “form
and function” replacement for voice radio in its basic operating mode.  In this mode, verbal
communications carried between the controller and operator via the datalink will operate similar to
a radio.  During this initial period, there will likely be aircraft using both types of communication
equipment.  The ATC equipment must accommodate both systems, and both must have similar
implementations from the air traffic controllers perspective to avoid confusion.
A critical element of this integration is that all aircraft operating in controlled airspace
must transition to datalink-based surveillance and communication systems, including commercial,
general aviation and remotely operated aircraft.  The full benefits of a surveillance system like
ADS-B (including air-air capability) and non-verbal (text message) communications cannot be
realized unless all NAS users are equipped with the datalink systems.  Effectively transitioning to
a datalink-based airborne surveillance and communication capability will require that the FAA
mandate its use, and establish a fixed timetable for implementation of compatible systems for any
aircraft operating in the NAS.  As the ATC datalink system becomes established and proven, the
current radar and voice radio systems may eventually be phased out.
5.4.2 System Selection, Regulation and Certification
The datalink-based system that is selected by the FAA, and in particular the datalink
technology chosen, must be compatible with all types and classes of NAS users.  In addition, the
system should be interoperable with international operations.  This is particularly critical for an
ROA that will be operated both in the NAS and in international airspace.  It may not be practicable
to equip the vehicle with more than one ATC datalink option, either a terrestrial or satellite-based
system depending on the ROA mission and operating environment.  To adequately serve all
37
airspace users, both a LOS terrestrial and a BLOS SATCOM datalink option must be
accommodated in the NAS.
Introduction and transition to a datalink-based airborne surveillance and communication
system will require numerous changes to the en route procedures and FAR requirements that
have evolved for the current radar and radio based system.  Updated or new FARs must
specifically address datalink-based systems, including data formats and protocols, operating
procedures and minimum equipage for IFR and VFR operations in each applicable airspace
category.
The proposed datalink-based system for airborne surveillance uses information from the
aircraft’s primary onboard systems, rather than from secondary systems and external FAA-
operated equipment as with a radar-based system.  This primary (datalink) system is also the
central element for the airborne communication function.  Therefore the FAA will have to establish
certification procedures and minimum performance standards for all ATC-related equipment
including navigation systems and ATC and command and control datalinks.  The standards must
address the robustness of the equipment including system reliability and redundancy, and also
specify a minimum accuracy for the aircraft parameters that are transmitted (position, altitude,
and airspeed).
5.5        SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS
Using a digital datalink to implement the airborne surveillance and communication ATC
functions with an ROA has several safety advantages and issues that must be considered.
These are discussed in the following paragraphs.
5.5.1 Datalink Safety Advantages
Using a datalink to implement the airborne surveillance and communication function in an
ROA has several safety advantages over the current radar and voice radio based systems.  First,
BLOS datalink systems may be used at longer ranges, and can cover areas where current
systems are not effective (such as remote regions, mountainous terrain, at very low altitude or
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over the open ocean).  In these areas, LOS radar and voice radio systems are not able to provide
satisfactory coverage of the airborne ROA.
Second, the datalink allows additional airborne surveillance data and text messages to be
passed between the ROA and the air traffic controller.  This data may include the ROA’s velocity ,
maneuvering state, and future intentions in addition to the basic aircraft identification and position
information.  This additional data gives the air traffic controller and the ROA remote operator
more useful information with which to safely conduct operations.
Finally, datalink technology such as ADS-B is also able to provide more accurate
airborne surveillance data and at a much higher update rate, giving the air traffic controller a near
real-time indication of the airborne situation.  This improved performance will give the air traffic
controller an expanded capability to determine the precise location of all airborne traffic and
effectively ensure positive deconfliction.
5.5.2 Datalink Safety Issues
Using a datalink to implement the airborne surveillance and communication function in an
ROA also has a number of safety issues that must be addressed.  In general, as commercial
ROA are introduced into the NAS in significant numbers, they will have to demonstrate that they
are capable of operating alongside manned aircraft with no undue impacts to safety.  ROA will
have to meet all current and any future regulatory requirements that may arise.  In addition, the
public perception regarding the safety of unmanned vehicles operating in the NAS will have to be
addressed.  This may require additional safety measures to be undertaken above and beyond the
FAR minimums, at least until the ROA systems have proven themselves and become accepted
by the general public.
In addition to the general safety issues discussed in the preceding paragraph, there are
several specific issues.  First, the datalink may be the sole system enabling both of the critical
airborne functions of surveillance and communication.   It must have sufficient reliability and
redundancy to ensure these functions are not interrupted or degraded beyond an acceptable
level.  In the ADS-B technology, the same ROA subsystems that are used for aircraft navigation
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are also used for ATC surveillance information.  A failure of the vehicle’s GPS-based navigation
system may provide the same erroneous position data to both the ROA remote operator and the
air traffic controller, with limited ability to cross-check the information.  Establishing end-to-end
redundancy in the entire system is essential, and no single-point failure modes will be
permissible.  This redundancy must include the aircraft navigation system that provides ADS-B
inputs, the ROA’s ATC and command and control datalink systems, the ground transceiver and
relay systems, and the ATC facility systems.  Reliability and redundancy are integral features of
the ROA and ATC systems, and must be included in the design and development of the systems
from the outset.
Second, the system must degrade gracefully in response to discrete or systemic failures.
Graceful degradation of a system requires that one failed component or subsystem not
incapacitate the entire system, and that the system provide a positive indication in the event that
a component fails or degrades.  Any degradations or component failures must be recognizable,
and an acceptable backup system or procedural response that maintains the overall ROA system
safety must be available.  As with reliability and redundancy, these issues (graceful degradation
and system backups) are integral to the design of the ROA and ATC systems.
In addition, the integrity of the datalink itself must be considered.  The link must be
available at all times, with no appreciable dropouts or degradations that effect the ability to send
and receive messages.  The datalink must not be overly sensitive to environmental factors and
meet DO-160 requirements, and be able to carry high message traffic volume during peak
airborne traffic periods.
The inherent lags and delays in datalink communications technologies are the final safety
issue that will be discussed.  Datalinks operate by compiling data over a discrete time period,
then transmitting the encoded message in a burst.  The incoming message must be received in
its entirety, then decoded and presented to the user of the information.  This complicated process
takes a finite amount of time.  For a BLOS SATCOM datalink, an additional delay is normally
encountered due to the accommodation of multiple users on a single satellite channel.  Although
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there are many processing schemes used for SATCOM, they generally add a time delay to each
message that passes through the relaying satellite.  For a two-way communication, this BLOS
SATCOM delay can be up to approximately 7 seconds as was discussed in section 3.2 for the
Global Hawk ROA system.  With appropriate training and operating protocols, the ROA remote
operator and air traffic controller will become accustomed to this delay, and may be able to
function effectively with the datalink-based systems.  This inherent lag in the transfer of airborne
surveillance and communication messages will have to be accommodated in the effected
regulatory procedures such as the separation requirements for datalink-equipped aircraft.
5.6        EFFICIENCY CONSIDERATIONS
5.6.1 Airborne Surveillance
Implementation of the air-ground capabilities inherent in an ADS-B-like digital datalink
system for airborne surveillance will result in an increase in efficiency in several areas.  The near
real-time update rates and much greater accuracy over radar in airspeed, altitude and especially
position will allow the air traffic controller to establish the location of datalink-equipped aircraft
much more precisely.  This will allow the controller to decrease the lateral and vertical separation
requirements and utilize existing airspace more densely.  The same separation requirement may
be applied to datalink-equipped aircraft regardless of where they are in a control sector; with
radar-based surveillance, position uncertainty increases with range, necessitating increased
separation minimums at greater distances from the radar site.
The increased effective surveillance range of the digital datalink will allow conflict
detection and resolution to be implemented at increased distances between aircraft.  This will
increase mission flexibility and allow aircraft to operate with a minimum of constraints.  This is
especially important for an ROA that needs to fly a precise flight profile to conduct its specific
mission role.  By identifying a potential conflict earlier, any required maneuvering or route
adjustments and resulting disruptions in the ROAs mission may be minimized.
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The digital datalink will allow precision tracking services to be expanded to areas not
presently covered by the radar-based airborne surveillance system.  These areas are currently
required to use inefficient non-radar separation procedures.  Non-radar procedures require large
vertical, lateral or longitudinal separation margins that limit the number of users in a given sector
and also constrain their operating flexibility.  A precision tracking capability in these areas will
increase airspace usage efficiency, and benefit manned and unmanned aircraft.
The air-air capabilities inherent in an ADS-B-like digital datalink system for airborne
surveillance are a key enabling technology for the transition to a Free Flight environment.  Free
Flight will revolutionize the airborne surveillance function, and greatly increase the efficiency of
the NAS utilization.  This ATC environment will allow ROAs in particular to fly the varied and
flexible profiles required for their unique missions and roles.
5.6.2 Airborne Communication
The digital datalink will allow increased quantities and rates of information to be passed
between the air traffic controller and the ROA remote operator.  The datalink system will also
permit non-verbal text messages to be communicated.  This increased effective flow of
information will allow the controller and remote operator to work together to execute the desired
flight profiles with a minimum of constraints and delays.  The textual messages in particular will
permit useful data such as aircraft intentions, flight requests, and weather or traffic status to be
exchanged and exploited.
The increased effective range of the digital datalink will expand communications
coverage beyond the current capabilities of the LOS radio.  As with airborne surveillance, this
greater range will increase ROA mission flexibility and allow aircraft to operate safely at further
distances from ground ATC sites.
5.7        SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS
Use of a digital datalink to implement the airborne surveillance and communication ATC
functions for an ROA has several security considerations that must be considered.  The first
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security issue is authentication of the digital data messages between the air traffic controller,
ROA and remote operator12.  Technologies and protocols will be required to permit the source
and content of messages to be verified.  This will prevent an unauthorized party from emulating
one of the communication nodes and transmitting bogus or corrupted messages.  The second
security issue is intentional interruption of the datalink communications.  The ATC and the
command and control datalinks should be designed to preclude jamming from external sources.
The end-to-end datalink system must be robust and secure to prevent an interruption of the ability
to maintain surveillance and communications with airborne manned and unmanned aircraft.
To rely on digital datalink as the sole or primary source for the airborne surveillance and
communication functions, effective and comprehensive security measures must be developed to
protect the integrity of the system.  This must be accomplished before widespread
implementation of the technology becomes practicable in the NAS.
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6.0 CONCLUSIONS
ROA have been established as highly useful systems for a number of military
applications.  A variety of ROA are currently in use by the military, and many more are under
development.  During extensive military testing and operational use, ROA non-military
applications have become apparent.  Civilian ROA have the potential for effective employment for
a wide range of missions and roles.  As civilian ROA system designs and concepts of operation
are refined, there will be many cost-effective applications for using ROA in roles currently
performed by manned aircraft or other systems.  In addition, new or expanded roles will be
identified that are enabled by the unique operating capabilities of ROA.  The economic viability of
ROA in performing these missions and roles will be the primary factor pushing the integration of
this technology and acceptance of widespread ROA operations in the NAS.
The current implementation of the airborne surveillance and communication functions in
the NAS will support limited ROA activities in the near-term.  This system of using primary and
secondary radar and LOS voice radio has limitations in terms of the total numbers of manned and
unmanned aircraft it can effectively support, and in the efficiency of services that may be safely
provided to a variety of ROA operating in the NAS.  The current ATC system has evolved in
support of the passenger transportation mission.  The airborne surveillance and communication
functions are optimized to service manned aircraft flying from one terminal area to another
terminal area via a designated route structure.  This “point-to-point” concept enables large
numbers of aircraft to move with relative efficiency and safety between their departure and
destination locations.  ROA flight profiles are dictated by their highly specialized missions, and
typically do not involve direct point-to-point navigation between two locations.  ROA missions and
roles will require flight profiles that loiter for extended periods over designated areas, follow along
a particular geographic feature such as a river or oil pipeline, or track a dynamic event such as
weather phenomena.  In addition, ROA are more likely depart and return to the same location.
To effectively conduct varied missions, ROA must be able to fly a planned mission on
desired route profiles with a minimum of restrictions and limitations.  These routes may
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encompass all classes of controlled airspace, and operating procedures must accommodate both
IFR and VFR traffic.  ROA must also have some reasonable level of flexibility en route to modify
their flight profile in response to changes in external or internal conditions.  External conditions
that might change include weather or the particular feature that is being monitored (fire, freeway
traffic, weather disturbance, etc.)  Internal conditions would include mechanical failures or
multiple sensor modes.
Two-way digital datalink technology has significant potential for use in implementing the
airborne surveillance and communication functions.  This technology provides more accurate and
comprehensive time-critical surveillance information to the air traffic controller, and facilitates
more efficient communications of large amounts of useful information between the air traffic
controller and the ROA remote operator.  One airborne surveillance datalink technology that has
been successfully demonstrated is ADS-B, which is one of the Free Flight operational
enhancements that are being proposed for the ATC system13.  ADS-B has the potential to
facilitate the en route flexibility that ROA require to safely and efficiently conduct their unique
missions.  In addition, the air-air feature inherent in ADS-B systems will enable an effective
“detect and avoid” capability for ROA without requiring additional dedicated sensor systems.
Current state of the art ROA lack effective technologies to accomplish the “detect and
avoid” criteria for VFR operations or for detecting VFR traffic while operating IFR in Class E
airspace.  This is a critical safety capability for detecting airborne traffic or other hazards such as
weather.   A cooperative means of accomplishing this function has been demonstrated using a
combination of transponder-based systems and onboard sensors.  In addition, the air-air
capabilities of ADS-B has the potential for satisfying the detect and avoid criteria for ROA.  An
effective means for implementing the airborne detect and avoid capability is essential for large-
scale safe operations of ROA in the NAS.  This capability must be enabled without requiring
additional dedicated sensor systems on the vehicle.
Finally, the operation of large numbers of ROA in the NAS using a two-way digital
datalink for the airborne surveillance and communication functions has a number of operational,
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safety and security issues.  The datalink systems must be compatible with a variety of types and
classes of ROA vehicles.  The ATC system must accommodate aircraft with mixed equipage
during the transition from radar and radio based systems to datalink based systems.  The end-to-
end datalink system must be robust and reliable, and preclude any unauthorized use or
intentional interruption.
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7.0 RECOMMENDATIONS
Two-way digital datalink technology should be pursued for implementing the airborne
surveillance and communication functions with an ROA in the NAS.  A datalink-based ATC
system has numerous benefits for ROA, and is a key enabling technology for expanding the
operations of ROA in the NAS.
Need further development of datalink technologies, including a full assessment of the
safety and security impacts of a datalink-based ATC system.  Critical issues are the reliability of
the datalink, susceptibility to corruption or interruption (intentional and non-intentional), and the
effects of the communication time delays.
To enable the integration of large numbers of ROA into the NAS using datalink
technology for airborne surveillance and communication, the FAA and the ROA industry must
take a number of positive steps.
1) The FAA must begin to consider ROA as an important user of the NAS.  The ROA
industry including commercial, military and research organizations must be included in the FAA’s
planning for future ATC system improvements.  This combined FAA/industry consortium should
define an appropriate course for integrating ROA into the ATC system and expanding their
presence in the NAS.
2) The FAA must embark on the Free Flight operational enhancements that have been
developed in conjunction with the NAS user community.  ADS-B in particular will provide
extensive efficiency and safety benefits for both manned and unmanned aircraft in the NAS and
should be pursued aggressively.  The full air-ground and air-air benefits of ADS-B can only be
realized when all aircraft operating in controlled airspace are equipped with an ADS-B transmitter.
This will not occur in a timely manner unless the FAA embraces the technology and its
implementation.
3) FAA certification standards and operating regulations must be updated to address the
unique needs and issues of ROA operating in the NAS.  The FAA must review the current FAR
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requirements and ensure that they are reasonable, correct and applicable to unmanned as well
as manned aircraft.  New FARs and subsequent updates must include all users of the NAS.
4) The ROA industry and user community must incorporate current FAA certification
requirements and operating standards to begin integrating into the NAS.  ROA should not expect
special consideration, tailored regulations or relaxed requirements from the FAA.  As ROA
become established and proven in the NAS, certification standards and operating regulations will
evolve to more effectively accommodate the unique requirements of unmanned vehicles.  In the
interim, first-generation ROA may require special design features and additional installed
equipment to interface with the ATC system that has evolved to support manned aircraft, and
prove their viability and safety in the NAS.  Lessons learned from these early ROA systems can
be applied as the ATC system evolves to fully include ROA-peculiar issues and needs.
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